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A STUDY OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
N recent years, as the demand for more efficient administration of
justice has reached unprecedented proportions,1 the traditional meth-
ods of judicial selection and awards of tenure have fallen into sharp
disrepute. Initial reaction to this situation was expressed in the adoption
by several states of improved methods of selection designed to overcome
the defects of the traditional elective systems.2 However, it soon became
apparent that while new methods proved effective in elevating well-
qualified individuals to the bench, they were no guarantee that those
selected would remain competent throughout their tenure. Thus, atten-
tion was turned toward the development of methods by which judicial
officers who were found incompetent or guilty of misconduct could be
disciplined and/or removed from office without resort to the cumber-
some procedures of a bygone era.$
In 1959, a national conference on court administration was held
in Chicago for the purpose of discussing various proposals for the
reform of the judiciary. Out of that conference came the following
recommendations:
Disability should be determined by a standing commission on
which the judiciary is represented .... There is a need for a less
cumbersome method to bring about the discipline or removal of a
judge . . . whose conduct has subjected or is likely to subject the
court to public censure or reproach or is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice.
The ultimate responsibility for disciplinary action or removal
should rest in the highest court of the state [and] [pjrovisions should
be made for the initiation and investigation of complaints before
I Braithwaite, Removal and Retirement of Judges in Missouri: A Field Study, 68 WASH.
U.L.Q. 378 (1968); Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem,
49 A.B.A.J. 166 (1963); Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and
Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 149 (1966).
2 See generally Garwood, Judicial Selection and Tenure -the Model Article Provisions,
47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 21 (1963).
3 Colorado serves as a good example for illustrating some of the outmoded methods of
disciplining judges. The first of these methods - and one which is still available - is
recall of a judge as provided for in COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1. This process involves
large amounts of time, extensive publicity, and numerous people; it can also overshadow
any real issue of competency. The second of these procedures (replaced by the commission
plan) was the old COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 31 provision which dealt with retirement
of judges. When questions of age and physical or mental infirmity or disability arose,
an investigation could be initiated only by a motion from the Colorado attorney general
to the Colorado Supreme Court. Thereafter, the court would appoint a referee to conduct
the investigation and submit his report thereon to the court. The court then decided
if mandatory retirement of the judge was fitting. It seems clear that both of these
procedures were difficult to work with effectively. Therefore, the need for more com-
petent and streamlined procedures was definitely felt in Colorado.
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presentment of formal charges, and precautions should be taken for
the protection of all persons involved.
4
In 1960, California adopted the essential features of this recommenda-
tion by constitutional amendment and became the first state to make use
of the "commission plan" for the retirement, removal, and discipline of
judges.'
The administrative and procedural advantages of the commission
plan over traditional methods of judicial discipline and removal and the
success of the California experiment prompted other states to follow
suit.6 In Colorado, the plan was adopted by constitutional amendment
in the fall of 1966 and became effective in April 1967.1 The purpose of
this article is to present the results of an in-depth study of the perform-
ance of the Colorado commission from its inception to the present.
More specifically, this article will set forth the statistical information
gathered from the study, describe the working procedures of the com-
mission, and evaluate its operational effectiveness.
I. METHODOLOGY
Anyone undertaking a study of the Colorado Judicial Qualifications
Commission will immediately find himself faced with what appears to
be an almost insurmountable obstacle: the constitutional requirement
that "[a]ll papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on
judicial qualifications . . . shall be confidential, and the filing of papers
with and the giving of testimony before the commission . . .shall be
privileged .... ,,8 In effect, this means that a researcher is constitution-
ally denied access to a rich source of information- the files of the
commission. As a result, the primary sources of information were inter-
views with the commission membership, the executive secretary of the
commission, and the president of the Colorado Bar Association.'
The interviews began with very general questions designed pri-
marily to put the respondent at ease and to give him some assurance
that the researchers' intent was purely academic. For example, the
respondent was usually asked to present his views concerning the
rationale of the commission plan and the factors accounting for its
445 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 12 (1959).
5 CALIF. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
6 For a state-by-state comparison of modem discipline and removal plans adopted in recent
years, see the report prepared for the National Conference of Judicial Retirement and
Disability Commission held at the University of Denver College of Law in August, 1969.
7 CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 23. For a complete text of the rules of procedure of the
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court on
May 18, 1967, see the APPENDIX infra.
8 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3) (d). See also Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, Rule 4.
9 Inasmuch as the Bar Association was the primary instrumentality in securing the adoption




success. Thereafter, he was asked to evaluate the work of the Colorado
commission, always being assured that the study was not interested in,
nor concerned with, specific names. While this approach may seem a bit
too cautious, it was found that following this short exchange, the
respondent was usually more willing to entertain probing questions
concerning the commission's work."0
Once the necessary rapport had been established, it was easier to
probe for the substance of the commission's work; and inasmuch as the
bulk of the commission's work is accomplished without resort to formal
procedures," the primary concern was with the informal structures and
processes, which constitute the functional nucleus of the Colorado com-
mission plan. To facilitate the research in this area, questions were
directed to the various steps taken by the commission in its consideration
of an individual complaint. Hence, it was first necessary to consider
the procedure by which complaints are brought to the attention of the
commission; and the questions employed were designed to elicit infor-
mation on the number, source, and nature of the complaints as well
as the processes by which they are received and screened.
Once a complaint is received, the next step is to institute a pre-
liminary investigation to determine whether or not the complaint has
merit.1 Thus, the next line of questioning dealt with the mechanics
of this investigation as well as its effect on the subsequent disposition
of complaints.
If it is determined that a complaint has merit, the judge is notified
and an informal hearing is scheduled.'3 It is at this stage that the
commission has demonstrated its worth; and, for this reason, a major
part of the interview was devoted to this subject. Of particular interest
was the process by which a judge is informally disciplined and either
agrees to correct his conduct or is forced to retire. It was also thought
important to ascertain the extent of input into the informal hearing by
the respective groups that make up the commission: judges, lawyers, and
laymen; therefore, the researchers attempted to get an idea of the inter-
action among the members, including any manifest disagreement or
dissension.
All but one of the complaints brought before the commission have
been disposed of by informal hearings or in some manner other than
a formal hearing. Consequently, this stage of the commission's pro-
cedures was of somewhat less interest. However, inasmuch as the formal
10 In one instance, however, the respondent, a county judge, was so reluctant to talk about
the commission that only general answers were elicited from him in response to the
questions asked.
n1 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rules 6-20.
12Id. Rule 5.
1
3 Id. Rule 5(b).
1970
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hearing does represent the ultimate weapon of the commission, some
attention was given to the procedures involved in its employment.
In addition to the structured approach outlined above, impromptu
questioning was also employed. This was often necessitated by the
introduction of unanticipated information into the interview by the
respondent. Needless to say, this type of questioning yielded extremely
useful data.
By employing the methods herein described, the constitutional
obstacle, which in the beginning appeared so threatening to the viability
of the study, was effectively bypassed. As a result, sufficient data was
obtained to permit a description in fairly precise terms of the functional
elements of the Colorado commission.
II. STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE COMMISSION: STATISTICAL
INFORMATION
The official title of the Colorado commission- the Commission
on Judicial Qualifications - is a misnomer, since the commission deals
not with qualifying judges to sit on the bench but with disciplining and
removing them. Five of the commission's nine members are judges
chosen by the supreme court: three from the district courts and two
from the county courts. 4 Of the four remaining members, two are
attorneys chosen by majority action of a committee consisting of the
Governor, the attorney general, and the chief justice of the Colorado
Supreme Court; 5 and two are laymen chosen by the Governor."6 All
members of the commission serve four-year terms.' 7 Once constituted,
the commission itself selects an executive secretary who handles the
administrative work of the commission.' 8 In addition, investigators are
hired to do the commission's "leg work."
On a purely conceptual level, the primary purpose of the commis-
sion is to recommend to the supreme court the removal or formal censure
of any judge found by the commission to be guilty of willful misconduct
in office, of willful or persistent failure to perform his duties, or of
intemperance. 19 Likewise, the commission is to recommend the retire-
ment of any judge having any disability which seriously interferes with
the performance of his duties."0 To effect this purpose, the commission
14 




18 Because of a low working budget, the commission has appointed as its acting executive
secretary the Colorado court administrator. Yet, the dual role played by the executive
secretary has had a significant impact on the development of commission procedures.
See § IV infra.




is empowered to investigate complaints,21 subpoena witnesses, 22 and
take evidence;2 8 and the commission's jurisdiction extends to all courts
in the state with the single exception of the county court of the City
and County of Denver.24
It should be emphasized that the formal powers outlined above are
almost never used. Instead, the real success of the commission has been
its ability to induce problem judges to resign or retire prior to formal
proceedings. It is for this reason that the primary concern in this study
is directed toward informal procedures which account for this result.
However, before turning to a consideration of those procedures, it will
be useful to review statistically the work of the commission during its
first 3 years of operation.25
As of January 1970, the commission had received 39 complaints
against the state's judges." Of these, 12 were disposed of as frivolous
on their face or as not within the jurisdiction of the commission. In
each of the 27 remaining cases, files were prepared and at least cursory
investigations made.
The vast majority of the complaints were from unhappy litigants
and represented what one respondent referred to as "cheap appeals."
However, at least two complaints have come from the bar association,
27
the highway patrol, the United States Attorney, and the executive
secretary; one has come from a juror; and a few have been initiated on
the commission's own motion.
The majority of complaints were concerned with the treatment of
litigants and lawyers and can be placed in the "cheap appeal" category.
Other complaints include three for excessive use of alcohol, two for
physical or mental disability, one for conflict of interest with a party to
a proceeding before the judge, and several for the mishandling of pro-
bate cases. Two additional complaints which involved felonious activities
21 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rule 5.
2ld. Rule 11.
2id. Rule 10.
NCOLO. CONST. art. VI, § 26. Discipline of Denver County Court judges is under the
jurisdiction of the Denver County Judicial Commission.
25 All of the statistical information herein referred to was acquired from the executive
secretary of the commission.
2 This figure represents the number of judges against whom complaints were received and
is somewhat lower than the actual number of complaints, since several complaints against
a particular judge are treated by the commission as one complaint. There are well over
100 judges in Colorado subject to the jurisdiction of the commission. This figure includes
seven supreme court justices; seven appeals court justices; 22 district court presiding
judges; 54 district court judges; one superior court judge; one probate judge and
two juvenile court judges for the second judicial district; and all county court judges,
except Denver County.
27 In talking with the president of the Colorado Bar Association, it was learned that
complainants often contact the Association for information on how to proceed with their
complaints. Of particular interest here is the fact that the president often advises the
complainant as to whether or not he has a valid complaint. Thus, to some extent the
Bar Association is an informal screening mechanism for the complaints against judges.
1970
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and which were thus outside of the commission's jurisdiction2" were
filed pending the outcome of the criminal procedures against the judges
involved.
The vast majority of complaints were found to be unwarranted or
frivolous in the course of the preliminary investigation. However, in
several cases the charges were found to be substantial enough to warrant
the notification of the judge and the initiation of a formal investigation.
Of these, two cases were disposed of after the receipt of a satisfactory
explanation by the judge involved. In several of the more serious cases,
however, the judges were asked to appear before the commission for
an informal hearing;29 and in all but one instance this appearance
proved to be the final step in the proceedings. The single exception
went on to the formal hearing stage but was disposed of before recom-
mendations to the supreme court became necessary.
The final disposition of the rather serious complaints received by
the commission demonstrates the commission's value: Under commission
pressure three judges have retired and two have resigned."0 Of these
five, two were found physically incapable of carrying on with their
duties, and three were found guilty of some form of misconduct. In
two additional cases in which the behavior in question did not warrant
removal, the judges were subjected to an informal censure by the com-
mission.81
These figures represent the work of the commission as far as it
can be reflected in statistical data. Of course, the more important ques-
tion for the purposes of this study concerns the procedures which
produce the data.
III. PROCEDURAL ELEMENTS
In order to determine the extent to which the commission makes
use of the formal procedures and powers made available to it and the
extent to which it resorts to informal procedures of its own development,
it is necessary to pinpoint the precise procedural elements which the
commission uses in considering and disposing of a particular complaint.
Concurrently, it is important to consider the roles played in this process
by the various members of the commission and its staff.
A. Setting the Machinery into Motion
In order for a complaint to receive commission consideration it must
be in writing, and sufficient details must be included to permit a prima
28 COLO. CONST. art. VI § 23(2).
29 The informal hearing is a procedural step invented by the commission and is not specifi-
cally provided for either by the amendment or the rules of procedure.
30 In addition, two judges - who no doubt would have retired - died before they had a
chance to do so.
31 The informal censure is another procedural invention not provided for in the amendment.
It will be more fully discussed at a later point in the paper.
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facie evaluation of the allegations. Complaints that are received by
telephone never receive commission consideration, and in such cases the
complainant is advised to put the complaint in writing. 2 Further,
when an anonymous complaint is received, the commission may or may
not act upon it, depending upon the seriousness of the charge and upon
whether or not the complaint appears valid on its face; at least one
anonymous complaint has been acted upon by the commission.
A related problem involves those instances in which the com-
plainant wishes to remain anonymous. Attorneys, for instance, are often
reluctant to complain for fear of retribution from the judge against
whom the charge is made. Hence, the commission has honored requests
for anonymity by initiating the action on its own motion, recognizing
that to do otherwise might stifle valid complaints. Of course, this
protection can only extend up to the time of the formal hearing; for
at that point, the complainant must be identified in order to provide
the accused with the opportunity for rebuttal and cross-examination.
However, since a formal hearing is almost never held, this problem is
minimal.
In any event, not all complaints are of sufficient substance to
warrant commission consideration, and there appears to be a two-step
screening process designed to eliminate obviously frivolous or un-
32 REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF
A member of the judiciary of the State of Colorado
TO THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
1, , complain about the above-
named (justice) (judge) of the court in
a Colorado, and that, as set forth in the statement below: he has
committed acts of willful misconduct in office; or he has wilfully and persistently failed
to perform his duties; or he is, or has been, habitually intemperate; or his conduct is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, so as to bring the judicial office into dis-
repute; or he has a disability that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties
and such disability is or is likely to become permanent.
STATEMENT
I therefore request that such misconduct be investigated and that appropriate action





being duly sworn on oath deposes and
says that he has read the foregoing request for investigation, knows the contents thereof,
and that the same is true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
1970
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founded complaints. First, the chairman of the commission, in con-
sultation with the executive secretary, reviews the complaint and
decides whether or not it should be docketed. The second step is the
presentation of all complaints - including those deemed to be frivolous
-to the entire commission for their determination as to disposition.3
This second step, however, is a mere formality, since the opinion of
the chairman is almost never challenged.
An interesting sidelight in this initiating process is the role of the
executive secretary who, in addition to being the executive secretary
of the commission, is also the Colorado court administrator. As such
he is kept apprised of the conditions in the state's courts and is in a
position to evaluate the competency of the judges. The indication that
he takes advantage of his dual role is evidenced by the fact that the
two judges who were forced to retire for ill health were brought to the
attenion of the commission by the executive secretary. Even more
important than his observation of the state courts is the contribution
he makes to the screening process of the commission; for there can
be little doubt that the chairman, in making his initial evaluation of
complaints, relies heavily on the executive secretary for information.
It should be noted that this contribution does not end with the evalua-
tion of complaints but is relevant throughout the proceedings.
B. The Investigation
Once a complaint is determined to be of sufficient substance on
its face to warrant some form of commission action, the investigative
procedures are set into motion. The first step is a preliminary investi-
gation which is usually conducted by a member of the commission and
which often involves no more than a phone call.34 The judge himself
is not notified, and, in order to protect his reputation, the persons
contacted are cautioned that the investigation is confidential. A signifi-
cant number of complaints are disposed of at this stage, particularly
those lodged by unhappy litigants.
If the results of the preliminary investigation do not negate the
assertions made in the complaint, a formal investigation is launched. 35
The first step in this process is notification of the offending judge."6
Notification may take the form of a mild, informal letter which recites
33 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rule 5(a). It should
be noted that this was not always the case. During the early months of the commission's
existence, obviously frivolous complaints were disposed of by the chairman and the
executive secretary without the consideration of the commission as a whole.
34 This stage of the investigation should not be confused with the "preliminary investiga-
tion" referred to in Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial
Qualifications. In practice the latter is better termed the formal investigation.
35 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rules 6(a)-(b).
36 d. Rule 6(c).
VOL. 47
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
the charges against the judge and invites an explanation.," However,
in some cases a formal, registered letter is used,88 the force of which
is calculated either to bring about the required change in the judge's
behavior or prompt him to begin thinking about resignation or retire-
ment.
After notifying the judges, the commission appoints an investigator
to ferret out the pertinent facts. In most states the executive secretary
heads up the investigation, but in Colorado special efforts are made
to keep the secretary out of the formal investigative procedures in order
to enable him to maintain the integrity of each of his two positions.3 9
In less serious cases, a member of the commission may be called upon to
conduct the investigation, especially if the member is from the same
area of the state as the judge against whom the complaint is filed. In
more serious cases, an investigator may be hired by the commission.
Often the formal investigation reveals the invalidity of the allega-
tions made in the complaint, and the matter is closed. However, when
the results of the investigation tend to confirm the charges, the com-
mission may choose one of two alternate courses of action depending on
the nature of the offense. First, if the offense is not particularly serious
- for example, a case involving mistreatment of counsel - a personal
contact may be in order. In such a situation the judge is asked by a
member of the commission, often one with whom he is acquainted, to
37 Id. Rule 5(b). Also presented here is a sample of such a letter:
STATE OF COLORADO
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS NO.
INQUIRY CONCERNING NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
NOTICE is hereby given to you, , that the Commission
on Judicial Qualifications of the State of Colorado has decided to conduct a preliminary
investigation of your conduct as County Judge pursuant to Rule 5 of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure.
This investigation is on the Commission's own motion and is based upon unverified
information submitted to the Commission indicating willful misconduct in that:
The Commission has appointed to investigate the afore-
mentioned matters and report back to the Commission.
You are further notified that under the rules of the Commission you may present
such matters as you may choose to the Commission for its consideration. The next
meeting of the Commission will be on in Denver, at which time you
are welcome to appear and to be represented by counsel should you choose to be so
represented. If you elect to appear, please contact the undersigned Chairman for the
time and place.
Your attention is called to the fact that this is not a formal proceedings for
discipline or removal, but only a preliminary investigation to enable the Commission to
determine whether formal proceedings are warranted.
Dated this 1971.
Chairman
Commission on Judicial Qualifications
of the State of Colorado
323 State Capitol Building
38ld. Rule 5(b).
" Interestingly, however, the investigator who has done the bulk of the work for the
commission is a former court administrator.
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mend his ways. He is then kept under observation for a time in order
to assure compliance. If he fails to bring his behavior into line with
commission wishes, further action may be taken. The members of the
commission all seem satisfied that this is an effective means of bringing
about conformity in cases involving minor complaints. The second
alternative is utilized in the case of a more serious offense and involves
asking the judge to appear at an informal hearing which may be
scheduled for the same day as the commission's regular quarterly meet-
ing or, in the case of a more urgent matter, on any day of the commis-
sion's choosing.
C. The Informal Hearing
Technically, the informal hearing is part of the investigative pro-
cedures, but because of the importance it has assumed, it warrants
separate treatment. While no specific provision is made for an informal
hearing in the commission's rules of procedure, the commission's power
to employ it can certainly be implied from the provision of the rules that
the judge "shall be afforded reasonable opportunity in the course of
the preliminary investigation to present such matters as he may
choose .. "40
At the informal hearing the judge is confronted with the evidence
against him and is asked to present any facts tending to negate the
charges.4 ' The judge accused of physical or mental incompetence may
also be asked to submit the results of a medical examination. While
the commission does not have the power to compel a judge to submit
to such an examination, it can consider a refusal to do so as a factor
tending to prove the truth of the allegations.
42
While the ostensible purpose of the hearing is to weigh the evidence
and make a preliminary evaluation as to the guilt or innocence of the
judge, it appears that the real purpose is to overwhelm the judge with
the incriminating evidence collected during the course of the investiga-
tion and thereby induce him to resign or retire. By the very nature of
the screening and investigative procedures, if a hearing is held there is
little doubt that the commission believes the allegations against the
judge to be true. Furthermore, all of the respondents indicated that
they would do all they could to see the matter disposed of short of
formal proceedings. This attitude is clearly attributable to a desire to
protect the judge and the judiciary as a whole from the prying eye of
the public.
In matters which are not serious enough to warrant a judge step-
ping down from the bench, the commission may, on its own motion,
40 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rule 5(b).
41 Id.
42 1d. Rule 9(b).
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censure the offender. While the power to informally censure a judge
is not provided for in either the amendment or the rules of procedure,.
it is a power assumed by the commission to fill a specific need. Just as
the commission, by applying informal pressure, has relieved the supreme
court of the burden of removing offending judges, so too has it devel-
oped a means of disciplining problem judges in a way comparable to
formal censure.
The informal censure has been used twice by the commission
once with success and once without. The case in which the procedure
has proved to be unsuccessful has been a particularly troublesome one
for the commission. It is a case which involves a judge whose obnoxious
behavior in the courtroom has prompted a great many complaints and
has resulted in several informal hearings. The difficulty appears to be
that despite commission pressure, the judge in question is unable to
alter his personality. This situation raises a question which has troubled
the commission since its inception: To what extent is the commission
to discipline judges who are guilty only of possessing a cranky disposi-
tion and a tendency to badger counsel and litigants? This problem of
"judicial temperament," as one commission member called it, appears
to be the only issue of discipline upon which the commission members
persistently disagree, and because of inconsistencies in some of the
interviewee's remarks, it was not possible to determine whether or not
the judges on the commission were more apt to excuse such behavior than
the other members. However, it appears that the disagreement does not
necessarily parallel the laymen, lawyer, judge division of commission
membership.
43
Despite the disagreement over the problem of judicial tempera-
ment, the commission membership is usually able to present a united
front at the informal hearing, and the results have been more than
satisfactory. However, whether or not the informal hearing results in a
retirement or censure depends entirely upon the judge's willingness to
force his right to a formal hearing. As has been noted, only one formal
hearing has been held, but this fact does not mean that other judges
will not pursue this course in the future. Nevertheless, it seems safe
to say that for the present the key element in the commission's proce-
dural arsenal is the informal hearing.
IV. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
If the performance of the Colorado commission during its first
3 years of operation is any indication of what can be expected in
the future, it seems safe to conclude that the commission plan is a viable
43 One of the laymen disagrees with this conclusion, charging that the judges often attempt
to whitewash the offensive behavior. Not surprisingly, this particular member considers
the role of layman on the commission to be that of a "watchdog" charged with keeping
the commission from becoming a vehicle for the unwarranted protection of the judiciary.
1970
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solution to the problem of judicial discipline in Colorado. This is not
to say, however, that there is no room for improvement.
As has been noted, one of the major problems facing the com-
mission is that of determining the standards by which judicial behavior
can be evaluated. In the past, the other commission members have
looked to the judges for guidance in this regard. However, opinions
differ even among judges as to what constitutes judicial misconduct.
Furthermore, there appears to be a growing reluctance on the part of
some members to defer to the judges on the commission. For example,
in a recent meeting of the commission one of the laymen defied the
consensus and demanded that the commission look into a matter involv-
ing somewhat questionable behavior. It is clear that such dissension
over standards can only hamper the effectiveness of the commission's
work; therefore the commission, as a matter of top priority, should
establish for itself clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes actionable
misconduct.
Another area in which improvement is needed involves the com-
mission's policy on publicity. Unlike its counterparts in other states, the
Colorado commission has not published yearly reports summarizing
its performance. As a result, very few people are aware of the commis-
sion's existence, and those who are aware of its existence are not sure
of its function. It is obvious that the commission's effectiveness will be
adversely affected if persons with valid complaints either fail to com-
plain or complain to the wrong officials who, out of ignorance of the
commission's existence, do not pass the complaint along. What is
needed then is an extensive publicity campaign designed to make the
commission's existence and effectiveness known to the lay public, the
practicing bar, and the public officials likely to receive complaints. Not
only would such a campaign tend to increase the number of valid
complaints, it would also enhance the commission's role as a forum
for the airing of frivolous complaints and thereby further protect the
judge from unwarranted publicity. Finally, public awareness of an
effective disciplinary mechanism would probably serve to increase public
confidence in the judiciary as a whole.
Another practice which could prove to be troublesome in the future
concerns the two hats worn by the present executive secretary. While
the fact that the secretary is also the court administrator has been a help
to the commission, commission members have come to depend on him
for information and have put considerable stock in his evaluation of
the validity of complaints. This could prove to be dangerously misplaced
reliance; for as the business of the courts increases, the two positions
will have to be severed, and the commission will be deprived of what
has come to be a significant functional input. It will then be forced to
fill the void with hastily contrived ad hoc measures which will impede
VOL. 47
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its effectiveness. Furthermore, there is always the present danger that
the secretary will come to be looked upon as a bird dog for the commis-
sion, a contingency which could seriously undermine his effectiveness
as court administrator. In order to avoid these possibilities, it is sug-
gested that the two positions be severed and that a full-time executive
secretary be hired by the commission. If this severance is not feasible
for lack of funds, then someone whose full-time position is not in any
way related to the administration of the courts should fill the position.
A final criticism (and one which was suggested by a respondent
and seems to have some validity) is that the commission is not aggres-
sive enough in prosecuting complaints. From what has been delineated,
it is safe to conclude that the commission will seldom proceed with a
complaint unless the allegations contained therein are supported over-
whelmingly by the evidence. Consequently, those judges whose guilt
is subject only to a minimal degree of doubt are exonerated without any
attempt to actually weigh the evidence and come up with a true decision
on the merits. Of course, this hesitancy on the part of the commission
can be explained by reference to the facts that new ground is being
broken and that the members are reluctant to establish precedents which
may prove undesirable. For this reason, one cannot be too critical
of the commission for its past caution. However, failure of the commis-
sion to assume a more forceful stance in the future could be an
important factor in undermining its effectiveness.
Despite these few criticisms, it is beyond dispute that the Colorado
experience tends to support the widespread consensus regarding the
effectiveness of the commission plan.44 In its 3 short years, the
Colorado commission has established itself as a viable and credible
mechanism for effecting judicial discipline and removal and, in so
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THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
MAY 18, 1967
L Definitions
In these rules, unless the context or subject matter otherwise
requires:
(a) "Commission" means the commission on judicial qualifications.
(b) "Judge" means a justice or judge of any court of record of this
state, except county judges of the city and county of Denver.
(c) "Chairman" includes the acting chairman.
(d) "Masters" means special masters appointed by the supreme
court upon request of the commission.
(e) "Presiding master" means the master so designated by the
supreme court or, in the absence of such designation, the judge first
named in the order appointing masters.
(f) "Examiner" means the counsel designated by the commission to
gather and present evidence before the masters or commission on the
charges against a judge.
(g) "Shall" is mandatory and "may" is permissive.
(h) "Mail" and "mailed" includes registered or certified mail.
(i) The masculine gender includes the feminine gender.
2. Interested Party
A judge who is a member of the commission or of the supreme court
may not participate as such in any proceedings involving his own
censure, removal, or retirement.
3. Confidentiality of Proceedings
All papers filed with and proceedings before the commission, or
before the masters appointed by the supreme court pursuant to rule 8,
shall be confidential.
4. Defamatory Material
The filing of papers with or the giving of testimony before the com-
mission, or before the masters appointed by the supreme court pur-
suant to rule 8, shall be privileged in any action for defamation. No
other publication of such papers or proceedings shall be so privileged,
except that the record filed by the commission in the supreme court
continues to be privileged.
5. Preliminary Investigation
(a) The commission, upon receiving a verified statement, not
obviously unfounded or frivolous, alleging facts indicating that a judge
is guilty of willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure
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to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute, or that he has a disability that seriously interferes with the
performance of his duties and is or is likely to become permanent,
shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether formal
proceedings should be instituted and a hearing held. The commission,
without receiving a verified statement, may make such a preliminary
investigation on its own motion.
(b) The judge shall be notified of the investigation, the nature of
the charge, and the name of the person making the verified statement,
if any, or that the investigation is on the commission's own motion,
and shall be afforded reasonable opportunity in the course of the
preliminary investigation to present such matters as he may choose.
Such notice shall be given by prepaid registered or certified mail
addressed to the judge at his chambers and at his last known residence.
(c) If the preliminary investigation does not disclose sufficient
cause to warrant further proceedings, the judge shall be so notified.
6. Notice of Formal Proceedings
(a) After the preliminary investigation has been completed, if the
commission concludes that formal proceedings should be instituted,
the commission shall without delay issue a written notice to the judge
advising him of the institution of formal proceedings to inquire into
the charges against him. Such proceedings shall be entitled:
"BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. "
(b) The notice shall specify in ordinary and concise language the
charges against the judge and the alleged facts upon which such
charges are based, and shall advise the judge of his right to file a
written answer to the charges against him within fifteen days after
service of notice upon him.
(c) The notice shall be served by the personal service of a copy
thereof upon the judge, but if it appears to the chairman of the commis-
sion upon affidavit that, after reasonable effort for a period of ten days,
personal service could not be had, service may be made upon the judge
by mailing, by prepaid registered or certified mail, copies of the notice
addressed to the judge at his chambers and at his last known residence.
7. Answer
Within fifteen days after service of the notice of formal proceedings,
the judge may file with the commission a legible answer which shall
be verified.
8. Setting for Hearing before Commission or Masters
Upon the filing of an answer or upon expiration of the time for its
filing, the commission shall order a hearing to be held before it con-
cerning the censure, removal, or retirement of the judge, or the com-
mission may request the supreme court to appoint three special
masters, who shall be justices or judges of courts of record, to hear and
take evidence in such matter, and to report thereon to the commission.
The commission shall set a time and place for hearing before itself or
before the masters and shall give notice of such hearing by registered
or certified mail to the judge at least twenty days prior to the date set.
9. Hearing
(a) At the time and place set for hearing, the commission, or the
masters, when the hearing is before masters, shall proceed with the
hearing whether or not the judge has filed an answer or appears at
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the hearing. The examiner shall present the case in support of the
charges in the notice of formal proceedings.
(b) The failure of the judge to answer or to appear at the hearing
shall not, standing alone, be taken as evidence of the truth of the facts
alleged to constitute grounds for censure, removal, or retirement. The
failure of the judge to testify in his own behalf or to submit to a med-
ical examination requested by the commission or the masters may be
considered, unless it appears that such failure was due to circumstances
beyond his control.
(c) A verbatim record shall be kept of the proceedings of the hear-
ing.
(d) When the hearing is before the commission, not less than five
members shall be present when the evidence is produced.
10. Evidence
At a hearing before the commission or masters, legal evidence only
shall be received, and oral evidence shall be taken only on oath or
affirmation.
11. Procedural Rights of Judge
(a) In proceedings involving his censure, removal, or retirement, a
judge shall have the right and reasonable opportunity to defend against
the charges by the introduction of evidence, to be represented by coun-
sel, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. He shall also have the
right to the issuance of subpoenas for attendance of witnesses to testify
or produce books, papers, and other evidentiary matter.
(b) When a transcript of the testimony has been prepared at the
expense of the commission, a copy thereof shall, upon request, be
available for use by the judge and his counsel in connection with the
proceedings, or the judge may arrange to procure a copy at his expense.
The judge shall have the right, without any order or approval, to have
all or any portion of the testimony in the proceedings transcribed at
his expense.
(c) Except as herein otherwise provided, whenever these rules
provide for giving notice or sending any matter to the judge, such
notice or matter shall be sent to the judge at his residence unless he
requests otherwise, and a copy thereof shall be mailed to his counsel
of record.
(d) If the judge is adjudged insane or incompetent, or if it appears
to the commission at any time during the proceedings that he is not
competent to act for himself, the commission shall appoint a guardian
ad litem unless the judge has a guardian who will represent him. In
the appointment of such guardian ad litem, consideration may be given
to the wishes of the members of the judge's immediate family. The
guardian or guardian ad litem may claim and exercise any right and
privilege and make any defense for the judge with the same force and
effect as if claimed, exercised, or made by the judge, if competent; and,
whenever these rules provide for serving or giving notice or sending
any matter to the judge, such notice or matter shall be served, given, or
sent to the guardian or guardian ad litem.
12. Amendments to Notice or Answer
The masters, at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing, or
the commission, at any time prior to its determination may allow or
require amendments to the notice of formal proceedings and may allow
amendments to the answer. The notice may be amended to conform to
proof or to set forth additional facts, whether occurring before or
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after the commencement of the hearing. In case such an amendment
is made, the judge shall be given reasonable time both to answer the
amendment and to prepare and present his defense against the matters
charged thereby.
13. Report of Masters
(a) After the conclusion of the hearing before masters, they shall
promptly prepare and transmit to the commission a report which shall
contain a brief statement of the proceedings had and their findings of
fact on the issues presented by the notice of formal proceedings and the
answer thereto, or if there be no answer, their findings of fact with
respect to the allegations in the notice of formal proceedings. When the
findings support the grounds alleged for censure, removal, or retire-
ment, the report shall be accompanied by an original and four copies
of a transcript of the proceedings before the masters.
(b) Upon receiving the report of the masters, the commission shall
promptly mail a copy to the judge.
14. Objections to Report of Masters
Within fifteen days after mailing of the copy of the masters' report
to the judge, the examiner or the judge may file with the commission a
statement of objections to the report of the masters, setting forth all
objections to the report and all reasons in opposition to the findings as
sufficient grounds for censure, removal, or retirement. A copy of such
statement, when filed by the examiner, shall be sent by registered or
certified mail to the judge.
15. Appearance before Commission
If no statement of objections to the report of the masters is filed
within the time provided, the commission may adopt the findings of
the masters without a hearing. If such statement is filed, or if the
commission in the absence of such statement proposes to modify or
reject the findings of the masters, the commission shall give the judge
and the examiner an opportunity to be heard orally before the commis-
sion, and written notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be
sent by registered or certified mail to the judge at least ten days prior
thereto.
16. Extension of Time
The chairman of the commission may extend for periods not to
exceed thirty days in the aggregate the time for filing an answer, for
the commencement of a hearing before the commission, and for filing
a statement of objections to the report of the masters, and the presiding
master may similarly extend the time for the commencement of a
hearing before masters.
17. Hearing Additional Evidence
(a) The commission may order a hearing for the taking of additional
evidence at any time while the matter is pending before it. The order
shall set the time and place of hearing and shall indicate the matters
on which the evidence is to be taken. A copy of such order shall be sent
by registered or certified mail to the judge at least ten days prior to
the date of hearing.
(b) In any case in which masters have been appointed, the hearing
of additional evidence shall be before such masters, and the proceed-





(a) If the commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the
supreme court the censure, removal, or retirment of the judge. The
affirmative vote of five members of the commission who have con-
sidered the record, and at least three of whom where present when
the evidence was produced, is required for a recommendation of
censure, removal, or retirement of a judge or for dismissal of the
proceedings.
(b) The commission, with good cause, may also recommend to the
supreme court that a judge be temporarily suspended from performing
judicial duties without loss of compensation, pending final disposition
by the supreme court of a commission recommendation for censure,
removal, or retirement. A recommendation for temporary suspension
shall require the affirmative vote of five members of the commission
who have considered the record, at least three of whom were present
when the evidence was produced.
19. Record of Commission Proceedings
The commission shall keep a record of all proceedings concerning a
judge. The commission's determination shall be entered in the record
and notice thereof shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the
judge. In all proceedings resulting in a recommendation to the supreme
court for censure, removal, or retirement, the commission shall prepare
a transcript of the evidence and of all proceedings therein and shall
make written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to
the issues of fact and law in the proceedings.
20. Certification of Commission Recommendation to Supreme Court
Upon making a determination recommending the censure, removal,
or retirement of a judge, the commission shall promptly file a copy of
the recommendation, certified by the chairman or secretary of the
commission, together with the transcript and the findings and conclu-
sions, with the clerk of the supreme court and shall immediately send
by registered or certified mail to the judge notice of such filing together
with a copy of such recommendation, findings, and conclusions.
21. Review of Commission Proceedings
(a) A petition to the supreme court to modify or reject the recom-
mendation of the commission for censure, removal, or retirement of a
judge may be filed within thirty days after the filing with the clerk of
the supreme court of a certified copy of the recommendation com-
plained of. The petition shall be verified, shall be based on the record,
shall specify the grounds relied on, and shall be accompanied by
petitioner's brief and proof of service of three copies of the petition
and of the brief on the commission. Within twenty days after service
on the commission, the commission shall serve and file a respondent's
brief. Within fifteen days after service of such brief, the petitioner may
file a reply brief, of which three copies shall be served on the commis-
sion.
(b) Failure to file a petition within the time provided may be
deemed a consent to a determination on the merits based upon the
record filed by the commission.
(c) The Rules of Civil Procedure in appellate proceedings before
the supreme court shall apply to proceedings in the supreme court for
review of a recommendation of the commission, except where express
provision is made to the contrary or where the application of a par-
ticular rule would be clearly impracticable, inappropriate, or inconsis-
tent.
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